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Abstract The cornerstone of the government’s adjustment program is to increase the efficiency
of private investment and activity by deregulating the economy and promoting competition. The
counterpart of this fundamental strategy is the need to increase the effectiveness of the public
sector which in Pakistan had become overextended. To this end, public sector resources and
management capacity are being redirected and concentrated in those areas in which public sector
intervention is required because of market failures or social objectives. The results obtained
strongly suggest that the government’s program is supported by strong empirical evidence. There
is no question that private investment has been discouraged by the public capital formation in
manufacturing. Not only has government investment in this area stifled the private sector, but also
it has diverted funds away from productive activities that would most likely have encouraged a
follow-on expansion in private investment.
Introduction
The sources of growth in any country can be examined from several different
perspectives, each suggestive of policy actions undertaken by government
authorities:
(1) The factors of production – the relative contribution of labor capital and
the like to overall output.
(2) The major sources of output demand – consumption, investment, exports.
(3) Sectoral contribution to growth – the contribution to output made by
agriculture, manufacturing, etc.
Regarding the sectoral contributions to growth in Pakistan, Burney (1986)
found that over the 1960-85 period, commodity producing sectors (agriculture
and manufacturing) accounted for than 40 percent of the growth in GDP. The
major crops were the main source of the varying contribution of agriculture. In
the case of manufacturing, large-scale sectors’ output accounted for more than
60 percent of the contribution. 
The economy has gone through a number of major changes since 1985. In
particular (but especially from 1988 onwards) progress has been particularly
strong in the area of freeing the private sector from regulation and artificial
price distortions. In addition, a complementary privatization program was
launched with the aim to reduce the role of the public sector in manufacturing
and services, thereby alleviating the government’s financial and administrative
burden and creating new opportunities for the private sector.
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For the government’s strategy to work it must be shown that increased private
investment in manufacturing elicits a follow-on expansion in private investment
in other key sectors. It must also be shown that the process of diverting investment
from government manufacturing enterprises to other activities will increase the
overall efficiency of public funds in stimulating follow-on private investment.
The purpose of this paper is to explore these issues. Has the expansion of
private investment in manufacturing increased the profitability of investment in
other key sectors of the economy? And, if so, in which areas? Has government
investment in manufacturing produced similar effects? Would a diversion of
public investment funds from manufacturing to areas supporting private
investment (energy, infrastructure) stimulate greater amounts of private
investment and if so in which sectors?
Patterns of investment
A brief examination of recent trends in investment is useful to put several of
these issues into perspective. The major categories of investment have
undergone considerable change sine the early 1970s. In particular:
(1) Total government investment (Table I) accounted for around 43 percent
of national investment in 1973. Under the first Bhutto administration this
quickly reached 63 percent in 1976, only to fall gradually since that time.
During the 1980-87 period the government accounted for nearly 55
percent of the country’s capital formation. By 1988-92 its average was
slightly under 50 percent. 
(2) The decline in the role of government investment is even more stark
when looking at its contribution to the growth in national investment.
During the 1980-87 period of the national investment growth of 6.25
percent, 2.86 percent was contributed by the public sector. While the
growth of national investment was more or less constant into the 1988-92
period (6.22 percent), the public sector only contributed 0.89 percent.
(3) Similar patterns are reflected in the public’s sector’s investment in semi-
public enterprises (Table II). In addition to manufacturing these enterprises
include the Indus Basin, Electricity and Gas, Agriculture and some service
activities. For the period as a whole (1973-92) government investment in
these enterprises accounted for slightly over 30 percent of national
investment. Again this reached a peak in the mid-1970s with investment in
this area averaging 33.44 percent for the decade as a whole. Since then,
investment has declined to 31.13 percent over the 1980-82 period and 26.38
for the period of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment.
From an average growth of 18.33 percent, investment in these activities
declined to slightly under 3 percent for the 1988-92 period.
(4) Even more dramatic shifts have occurred with regard to public investment
in manufacturing (Table III). During the 1970s public capital formation was
particularly active in this area, with the share of national investment
accounted for by these activities reaching 18.88 percent in 1978 (up from





at an average rate of slightly over 75 percent. With average rates of
investment declining by 13.01 percent during the 1980-87 period, the share
of total investment going into public enterprises averaged around 2 percent
in the 1988-92 period.
(5) Public investment in energy is another area that has experienced great
volatility. However, this has been an area of general expansion rather
than the contraction experienced in semi-public enterprises. While the
share of energy investment averaged about 10 percent for the 1973-92
period as a whole, the average in 1988-92 was well over 14 percent. This
is in sharp contrast to an average of 8.71 percent during the 1970s.
Growth in total Government investment
Year investment Value Share Growth Contribution
1973 –3.39 14.16 42.94 5.77 2.26
1974 6.79 19.46 55.27 37.44 16.08
1975 21.23 25.21 59.07 29.56 16.34
1976 22.42 32.91 63.00 30.57 18.06
1977 5.84 34.35 62.12 4.36 2.75
1978 0.60 33.91 60.96 –1.29 –0.80
1979 3.21 34.96 60.89 3.11 1.89
1980 12.04 37.93 58.95 8.48 5.16
1981 –2.17 34.43 54.71 –9.22 –5.43
1982 4.63 37.70 57.26 9.51 5.20
1983 7.56 40.14 56.67 6.46 3.70
1984 2.11 39.49 54.60 –1.62 –0.92
1985 7.75 42.09 54.01 6.57 3.59
1986 8.76 46.07 54.36 9.46 5.11
1987 9.30 51.57 55.67 11.94 6.49
1988 1.54 50.29 53.47 –2.47 –1.37
1989 10.19 53.70 51.82 6.78 3.62
1990 4.52 52.31 48.29 –2.59 –1.34
1991 6.88 55.65 48.07 6.38 3.08
1992 7.98 56.17 44.93 0.93 0.45
AV 72-92 6.89 – 54.85 8.01 4.20
AV 73-79 8.10 – 57.75 15.65 8.08
AV 80-92 6.24 – 53.29 3.89 2.10
AV 80-87 6.25 – 55.78 5.20 2.86
AV 88-92 6.22 – 49.32 1.81 0.89
VA 72-92 40.09 – 28.94 132.93 36.08
VA 73-79 85.19 – 41.99 222.86 58.73
VA 80-92 14.44 – 14.97 36.15 11.37
VA 80-87 17.96 – 2.60 43.83 14.16
VA 88-92 8.81 – 9.07 16.80 4.52
Note:
Value in millions of 1985 rupees;
AV = average;
VA = variance.
Computed from World Bank data. Contribution to the growth in total national investment is













(6) In contrast to the other main areas of pubic investment, general
government investment (including federal, provincial and local) has
remained fairly stable at around 20 percent of national investment. On
the other hand, some deceleration has taken place in recent years. During
the 1988-92 period capital formation (largely infrastructure) by these
organizations expanded on average at only 0.57 percent. This is in sharp
contrast to the 7.87 percent average of the 1980-87 period and the 16.63
average growth achieved in the 1970s.
(7) In general, private investment has been considerably more stable (measured
by the average variance) than public capital formation. Its share in total
Growth in total Government investment
Year investment Value Share Growth Contribution
1973 –3.39 6.56 19.89 –17.83 –4.17
1974 6.79 9.92 28.19 51.35 10.21
1975 21.23 13.83 32.40 39.36 11.09
1976 22.42 20.49 39.21 48.15 15.60
1977 5.84 20.36 36.81 –0.64 –0.25
1978 0.60 21.87 39.31 7.42 2.73
1979 3.21 21.98 38.28 0.52 0.20
1980 12.04 25.46 39.58 15.83 6.06
1981 –2.17 19.73 31.35 –22.50 –8.91
1982 4.63 19.54 29.67 –0.98 –0.31
1983 7.56 21.99 31.05 12.54 3.72
1984 2.11 21.54 29.78 –2.05 –0.64
1985 7.75 22.64 29.06 5.12 –1.52
1986 8.76 24.58 29.00 8.55 2.48
1987 9.30 27.37 29.05 11.36 3.29
1988 1.54 26.14 27.79 –4.49 –1.33
1989 10.19 30.76 29.68 17.66 4.91
1990 4.52 27.93 25.78 –9.20 –2.73
1991 6.88 27.63 23.87 –1.05 –0.27
1992 7.98 30.95 24.76 12.01 2.87
AV 72-92 6.89 – 30.75 8.56 2.31
AV 73-79 8.10 – 33.44 18.33 5.06
AV 80-92 6.24 – 29.30 3.29 0.82
AV 80-87 6.25 – 31.13 3.48 0.90
AV 88-92 6.22 – 26.38 2.98 0.69
VA 72-92 40.09 – 28.57 356.16 29.04
VA 73-79 85.19 – 44.99 646.49 45.21
VA 80-92 14.44 – 13.72 120.66 14.04
VA 80-87 17.96 – 10.84 131.33 17.90
VA 88-92 8.81 – 4.43 103.43 7.84
Note:
Value in millions of 1985 rupees;
AV = average;
VA = variance.
Computed from World Bank data. Contribution to the growth in total national investment is
computed by weighing the government investment in manufacturing growth rate by the
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capital formation has gradually risen since the mid-1970s to the point where
during the 1988-92 period it averaged slightly over 50 percent for the first
time. As might be expected growth was lowest in the 1970s (1.63 percent). It
is encouraging that the highest rate of expansion (10.94 percent) in private
investment has been in the 1988-92 period of reform and adjustment. 
(8) The expansion in private investment in manufacturing has been
particularly strong since 1980, averaging well over 19 percent per annum
through 1992. 
(9) As a result of this surge in capital formation in large scale manufacturing,
these activities accounted for nearly 22 percent of national investment in
Growth in total Government investment
Year investment Value Share Growth Contribution
1973 –3.39 0.39 1.17 –2.97 –0.03
1974 6.79 1.08 3.08 180.96 2.12
1975 21.23 2.46 5.77 127.36 3.92
1976 22.42 6.56 12.56 166.49 9.60
1977 5.84 8.41 15.20 28.14 3.53
1978 0.60 10.50 18.88 24.93 3.79
1979 3.21 10.79 18.80 2.77 0.52
1980 12.04 9.67 15.03 –10.43 –1.96
1981 –2.17 6.38 10.14 –34.01 –5.11
1982 4.63 5.71 8.66 –10.56 –1.07
1983 7.56 5.90 8.33 3.39 0.29
1984 2.11 5.96 8.24 0.97 0.08
1985 7.75 3.87 4.97 –35.01 –2.88
1986 8.76 4.47 5.28 15.59 0.77
1987 9.30 2.95 3.19 –33.99 –1.79
1988 1.54 2.59 2.76 –12.23 –0.39
1989 10.19 2.04 1.97 –21.27 –0.59
1990 4.52 1.60 1.48 –21.44 –0.42
1991 6.88 1.81 1.56 12.69 0.19
1992 7.98 2.80 2.24 54.72 0.85
AV 72-92 6.89 – 7.46 21.80 0.57
AV 73-79 8.10 – 10.78 75.38 3.35
AV 80-92 6.24 – 5.68 –7.04 –0.93
AV 80-87 6.25 – 7.98 –13.01 –1.46
AV 88-92 6.22 – 2.00 2.49 –0.07
VA 72-92 40.09 – 32.6 3841.75 8.81
VA 73-79 85.19 – 47.1 5476.68 8.66
VA 80-92 14.44 – 15.8 583.43 2.59
VA 80-87 17.96 – 11.8 332.47 3.28
VA 88-92 8.81 – 0.2 837.11 0.28
Note:
Value in millions of 1985 rupees;
AV = average;
VA = variance.
Computed from World Bank data. Contribution to the growth in total national investment is
computed by weighing the government investment in manufacturing growth rate by the












1992. The comparable figures for 1980 and 1973 were 5.25 and 8.5 percent
respectively. Perhaps more importantly, as a result of its increased share
of total investment, private investment in large scale manufacturing
accounted for about one half (3.15 of a total of 6.22) of the growth in total
national investment during the 1988-92 period.
(10) Investment in small scale manufacturing has been somewhat more
stable than that in larger scale enterprises. This stability has resulted in
capital formation in these firms averaging around 2.5 percent for each of
the major sub-periods examined. However, it is encouraging that during
the 1988-92 period, investment grew at nearly 12 percent in this area (up
from an average of 7.19 percent for the period as a whole).
Patterns of causal impact
These patterns are of interest in and of themselves. However, for policy
purposes one needs to go a step further and examine the direction (and
magnitude) of impact investment in manufacturing has had on capital
formation in the other major areas of economic activity. Clearly, if it can be
shown that increases in private sector investment in manufacturing encourage
and promote an expansion of private sector investment in other areas of the
economy (and public investment in manufacturing does not) then the case for
privatization in manufacturing is very strong. Other patterns would provide
much less support for the government’s program.
The original and most widely used causality test was developed by Granger
(1969, 1980, 1986, 1988). According to this test, increased manufacturing
investment causes (say) growth in investment in the construction sector, if rates
of expansion in investment in the construction sector can be predicted more
accurately by past values of manufacturing investment than by past rates of
growth of investment in construction. To be certain that causality runs from
manufacturing to construction, past values of manufacturing must also be
more accurate than past values of construction in predicting the observed rates
of growth in manufacturing investment over time.
Granger test
More formally, Granger (1969) defines causality such that X Granger causes (G-
C) Y if Y can be predicted more accurately in the sense of mean square error,
with the use of past values of X than without using past X. Based on the
definition of Granger causality, a simply bivariate autoregressive (AR) model
for manufacturing investment and that of investment in the non-manufacturing
sector can be specified as follows:
(1)
(2)
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where SEC is the growth in non-manufacturing sectoral investment and MAN
= the growth in real manufacturing investment.; p, q, r and s are lag lengths for
each variable in the equation; and u and v are serially uncorrelated white noise
residuals. Assuming that error terms (u, v) are “nice” ordinary least squares
(OLS) becomes the appropriate estimation method.
If the disturbances of the model were serially correlated, the OLS estimates
would be inefficient, although still unbiased, and would distort the causal
relations. The existence of serial correlation was checked by using a maximum
likelihood correlation for the first-order autocorrelation of the residuals [AR(1)].
The comparison of both OLS and AR(1) results indicated that no significant
changes appeared in causal directions. Therefore, we can conclude “roughly”
that serial correlation was not serious in this model.
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F-test is
appropriate for causal detection:
(3)
where RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and
unrestricted models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the
degrees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models.
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner: first,
unidirectional causality from MAN to SEC if the F-test rejects the null
hypothesis that past values of MAN in equation (1) are insignificantly different
from zero and if the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that past values of
SEC in equation (2) are insignificantly different from zero. That is, SEC causes
MAN but MAN does not cause MAN. Unidirectional causality runs from SEC
to MAN if the reverse is true. Second, bi-directional causality runs between
MAN and SEC if both F-test statistics reject the null hypotheses in equations (1)
and (2). Finally, no causality exists between MAN and SEC if we cannot reject
both null hypotheses at the conventional significance level.
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag
length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of
relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length,
the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be inefficient. While it is
possible to choose lag lengths based on preliminary partial autocorrelation
methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths equal for all types of
economic activity.
The Hsaio procedure
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio (1981) developed a systematic
method for assigning lags. This method combines Granger Causality and
Akaike’s final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean square prediction
error, to determine the optimum lag for each variable. In a paper examining the
problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and Batten (1985)
found Hsiao’s method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and
several other systematic procedures for determining lag length. 
F
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The first step in Hsiao’s procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive
regressions on the dependent variable. In the first regression, the dependent
variable has a lag of one. This increases by one in each succeeding regression.
Here, we estimate M regressions of the form:
(4)
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we compute the
FPE in the following manner:
(5)
where T is the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final prediction
error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal lag length, m*, is
the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Having determined m*,
additional regressions expand the equation with the lags on the other variable
added sequentially in the same manner used to determine m*. Thus we estimate
four regressions of the form:
(6)
with n ranging from 1 to 4. Computing the final prediction error for each
regression as:
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length which produces the
lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is
equivalent to using a series of F-tests with variable levels of significance. Since
the F statistic is redundant in this instance they are not reported here. They are,
however, available from the authors on request.
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term measures the
modeling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality property that “balances
the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to increases in
the variance when a higher order is selected” (Hsiao, 1979). As noted by Judge et al.
(1982), an intuitive reason for using the FPE criterion is that longer lags increase
the first term but decrease the RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing
forces are optimally balanced when their product reaches its minimum.
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases are possible: (a)
Manufacturing Investment causes Non-Manufacturing Sectoral Investment when
the prediction error for non-manufacturing decreases when manufacturing is
included in the growth equation. In addition, when non-manufacturing investment
is added to the manufacturing equation, the final prediction error should increase;
(b) Non-Manufacturing Investment causes Manufacturing Investment when the
prediction error for non-manufacturing increases when manufacturing is added to
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manufacturing is added to the regression equation for manufacturing; (c)
Feedback occurs when the final prediction error decreases when manufacturing is
added to the sectoral output equation, and the final prediction error decreases
when non-manufacturing output is added to the manufacturing equation; and (d)
No Relationship exists when the final prediction error increases both when
manufacturing is added to the non-manufacturing investment equation and when
non-manufacturing output is added to the manufacturing equation.
Operational procedures
The data for manufacturing and non-manufacturing investment used to carry out
the causation tests were derived from various International Monetary Fund (IMF,
1996a) and World Bank reports (IBRD, 1984, 1991, 1992, 1993). These series were
deflated by the GDP price deflator (IMF, 1996) and differenced to achieve
stationarity (McCallum, 1993) prices. To determine if the results were sensitive to
the definition of manufacturing, both small and large scale firms were included in
the analysis. Relationships between manufacturing and other areas of the
economy were considered valid if they were statistically significant at the 95
percent level of confidence. That is, if 95 percent of the time we could conclude that
they had not occurred by pure chance, we considered them statistically significant.
As noted above, there is no theoretical reason to believe that manufacturing
investment and investment in all other sectors have a set lag relationship – that
is they impact on one another over a fixed time period. The period could be
rather short-run involving largely the spin-off from construction or longer-term
as either term expands from the stimulus provided by the other. To find the
optimal adjustment period of impact, lag structures of up to four years were
estimated. The lag structure with the highest level of statistical significance
was the one chosen to depict best the relationship under consideration (the
optimal lag reported in Tables IV and V).
Again the main questions of interest are: has the expansion in manufacturing
initiated an overall expansion in other key sectors of the economy? And if so
which areas? Has this pattern changed over time? Here again we are especially
interested in examining the impact of the post-1988 reform program.
Because of the need to include as many observations as possible in each
causality test, three regressions tests were made for each sector: (1) for the
entire time period (1974-1992), (2) the pre-reform years 1974-1988, and (3) the
inclusion of the pre-reform years (1978-82). We concluded that the reforms had
an impact on the relationship between sector output and overall economic
activity if the results in (3) above were significantly different than those
reported for the years covered in (2).
Results
Several[1] interesting patterns (Table IV) occur between the individual sectors
and investment in private sector investment in manufacturing:
(1) The pattern between private investment in large scale manufacturing and
that in agriculture has changed somewhat over time. For the period as a






Director of Optimal Relative
Sector causation lag Impact strength
Agricultural investment
Large-scale manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 4,4 +,+ w,w
1973-1988 Feedback 4,4 +,+ m,w
1977-1992 Manuf fi Ag 1 + m
Small-scale manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Ag 1 + w
1973-1988 Manuf fi Ag 3 + m
1977-1992 Manuf fi Ag 1 + w
Investment in mining
Large-scale manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Mining 2 + m
1973-1988 Manuf fi Mining 4 + w
1977-1992 Feedback 4,3 +,+ m,m
Small-scale manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Mining 1 + w
1973-1988 Manuf fi Mining 2 + w
1977-1992 Feedback 4,2 +,+ m,m
Investment in construction
Large-scale manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Const 1 + m
1973-1988 Manuf fi Const 3 + w
1977-1992 Manuf fi Const 1 + s
Small-scale manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 4,2 –,+ w,w
1973-1988 Feedback 4,2 –,+ w,w
1977-1992 Feedback 4,2 –,+ w,w
Transport investment
Large-scale manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Trans 3 + w
1973-1988 Manuf fi Trans 3 + w
1977-1992 Feedback 3,4 +,+ m,w
Small-scale manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 1,1 +,+ m,m
1973-1988 Feedback 1,1 +,+ w,w
1977-1992 Feedback 1,3 +,+ s,w
Investment in services
Large-scale manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 4,4 +,+ w,w
1973-1988 Feedback 4,1 +,+ s,w
1977-1992 Feedback 3,4 +,+ w,m
Small-scale manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Serv 1 + m
1973-1988 Manuf fi Serv 2 + w












agriculture. Here increases in each over a four-year period would increase
profitable opportunities in the other. The same pattern existed in the earlier
1973-88 period, but here the impact of private investment in agriculture
provided a stronger stimulus to investment in manufacturing than vice
versa. Finally in the 1977-92 period the direction of causation has evolved
to the point whereby it was largely from manufacturing to agriculture. 
(2) The patterns between small scale manufacturing were fairly
straightforward with investment in manufacturing encouraging a
follow-on expansion in capital formation in agriculture. However, this
pattern may have weakened somewhat with time, with the impact
stronger in the 1973-88 period than that from 1977 to 1992.
(3) Private investment in mining was also encouraged by expanded private
capital formation in private manufacturing activities. This pattern was
fairly similar for both small and large scale manufacturing, with the
impact greater in the case of large scale manufacturing. In more recent
years the pattern seems to have evolved into one of feedback with
private investment in manufacturing encouraging investment in mining
(after a two or three year lag). In return private investment in mining
stimulates (after a four year lag) a further expansion in capital formation
in manufacturing. In both instances the impacts are fairly strong. These
patterns suggest (and are only suggestive) that manufacturing is
becoming more integrated with indigenous mining interests, perhaps
resorting to domestic supplies rather than imports. 
(4) Private investment in large-scale manufacturing has a direct and positive
impact on private investment in construction. This impact occurs after a
fairly short interval (usually a year) and has strengthened over time.
Director of Optimal Relative
Sector causation lag Impact strength
Investment in other services
Large-scale manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 3,3 +,+ w,m
1973-1988 Feedback 3,3 +,+ w,w
1977-1992 No relationship – – –
Small-scale manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 4,2 2,1 w,s
1973-1988 Manuf fi OS 2 + w
1977-1992 Feedback 4,2 +,+ w,m
Note:
See text for description of the computational method. In the case of feedback, the first term
refers to the impact from sector investment fi manufacturing investment. The second term
depicts the relationship from manufacturing investment fi sector investment. All variables are
defined as natural logarithms. Strength assessment based on size of the regression coefficient(s)






(5) The patterns between private investment in small-scale manufacturing and
private investment in construction are more complex. While a feedback
relationship occurs, the links from construction to manufacturing are
negative (while those from manufacturing to construction are positive).
One possible explanation lies in the fact that the generally higher (than in
small scale manufacturing) rates of growth in private investment in large
scale manufacturing set off a construction boom which in turn diverts
resources from small scale investment.
(6) Investment in the transport sector has also been made more profitable by
private investment in investment in manufacturing. The impact from
manufacturing to transport has not been very strong, however. Furthermore
during more recent times a fairly strong feedback relationship has developed
between investment in transport causing a follow-on expansion in private
investment in manufacturing. This feedback pattern also characterizes the
relationship between small scale manufacturing and transport.
(7) Private investment in large-scale manufacturing and that flowing into
services is also characterized by a feedback pattern. Again in recent years
manufacturing has produced a impact stronger than in earlier periods.
(8) The category of other services (finance, insurance, wholesale and retail
trade and the like) may be too diverse to provide consistent patterns.
However, it is safe to say that in general investment in manufacturing
has encouraged follow-on investment in these activities. 
The general pattern that emerges from this analysis is one whereby private sector
investment in manufacturing appears to open up a number of profitable investment
opportunities in other key sectors of the economy. This relationship seems to be
strengthening over time. Also, there is some evidence that investment in the sectors
is becoming more interdependent, with investment in other sectors beginning to
feed back more to manufacturing, setting off another round of expanded capital
formation in that sector. Manufacturing appears to interact positively with all of the
other sectors – there are no reductions in investment in other sectors of the economy
during periods of expanded private capital formation in manufacturing.
For a contrast similar tests were performed using public investment in
manufacturing. As a basis of comparison similar causal tests were also
performed using government investment in energy and general government
investment. Again, several interesting patterns were found (Table V). While one
could go into great detail, several overriding patterns emerge:
(1) In general the links between public investment in manufacturing and
private investment in the other key sectors of the economy are negative.
That is expanded public sector capital formation in its manufacturing
enterprises has tended to discourage (and even reduce) private sector
investment in other sectors of the economy.
(2) While one might argue that this pattern is caused by public investment
crowding the private sector out of the country’s financial markets, other





both general government investment and public sector investment in
energy encourage follow-on investment by the private sector.
(3) Both general government and energy investment experience a number of
feedback patterns. They respond to the needs of the private sector and in
turn their expansion causes a follow on increase in private sector capital
formation.
Director of Optimal Relative
Sector causation lag Impact strength
Agricultural investment
Government investment manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 1,4 –,– w,w
1973-1988 Feedback 1,4 –,– m,w
1977-1992 Manuf fi Ag 4 (–) w
General government invest
1973-1992 Feedback 3,3 +,+ w,m
1973-1988 Feedback 3.3 +,+ w,m
1977-1992 Feedback 3,2 +,+ w,s
Government investment in energy
1973-1992 Feedback 2,1 +,+ w,m
1973-1988 Feedback 2,1 +,+ w,w
1977-1992 Feedback 2,4 +,+ w,m
Mining investment
Government investment manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 4,4 +,– w,w
1973-1988 Manuf fi Mining 1 (–) w
1977-1992 Feedback 3,2 +,– w,m
General government invest
1973-1992 Govtfi Mining 1 + m
1973-1988 Feedback 1,1 +,+ w,w
1977-1992 Feedback 3,4 +,+ w,s
Government investment in energy
1973-1992 Mining fi Energy 1 + m
1973-1988 Mining fi Energy 1 + m
1977-1992 Energyfi Mining 2 + m
Construction investment
Government investment manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Const 1 (–) w
1973-1988 Const fi Manuf 1 (–) m
1977-1992 Feedback 1,2 –,– w,w
General government invest
1973-1992 Govtfi Const 1 + m
1973-1988 Feedback 4,1 +,+ w,m
1977-1992 Feedback 2,1 +,+ w,w
Government investment in energy
1973-1992 Feedback 4,1 +,+ m,w
1973-1988 Const fi Energy 4 + m













Director of Optimal Relative
Sector causation lag Impact strength
Transport investment
Government investment manuf
1973-1992 Feedback 4 (–) w
1973-1988 Manuf fi Mining 1 (–) w
1977-1992 Feedback 4 (–) m
General government invest
1973-1992 Feedback 3,4 +,+ w,w
1973-1988 Feedback 4,4 +,+ w,w
1977-1992 Feedback 4,4 +,+ w,w
Government investment in energy
1973-1992 Feedback 1,4 +,+ w,m
1973-1988 Feedback 1,4 +,+ w,m
1977-1992 Energyfi Trans 2 + m
Service investment
Government investment manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Serv 1 (–) w
1973-1988 Manuf fi Serv 1 (–) w
1977-1992 Manuf fi Serv 4 (–) m
General government invest
1973-1992 Feedback 4,1 +,+ w,w
1973-1988 Feedback 4,3 +,+ w,w
1977-1992 Feedback 3,4 +,+ w,w
Government investment in energy
1973-1992 Feedback 1,4 +,+ w,m
1973-1988 Feedback 1,4 +,+ w,m
1977-1992 Feedback 1,4 +,+ w,w
Other service investment
Government investment manuf
1973-1992 Manuf fi Serv 4 (–) m
1973-1988 Manuf fi Serv 2 (–) s
1977-1992 No relationship — — —
General government invest
1973-1992 Feedback 2,1 –,+ w,m
1973-1988 Serv fi Govt 2 (–) w
1977-1992 Feedback 3,4 –,+ s,w
Government investment in energy
1973-1992 Feedback 4,4 +,+ w,m
1973-1988 Feedback 1,4 +,+ w,w
1977-1992 Feedback 1,3 +,+ w,w
Note:
See text for description of the computational method. In the case of feedback, the first term refers to
the impact from private sector investment fi government investment. The second term depicts the
relationship from government investment fi private sector investment. All variables are defined as
natural logarithms. Strength assessment based on size of the regression coefficient(s) and the






The cornerstone of the Government’s adjustment program is to increase the level
and efficiency of private investment and activity by deregulating the economy
and promoting competition. The counterpart of this fundamental strategy is the
need to increase the effectiveness of the public sector which in Pakistan had
become overextended. To this end, public sector resources and management
capacity are being redirected and concentrated in those areas in which public
sector intervention is required because of market failures or social objectives. 
The results obtained above strongly suggest that the government’s program is
supported by strong empirical evidence. There is no question that private
investment has been discouraged by the public capital formation in
manufacturing. Not only has government investment in this area stifled the
private sector, but it has diverted funds away from productive activities that would
in all likelihood have encouraged a follow-on expansion in private investment.
For these reasons, it is imperative that the government pursue its privatization
program. Progress to date has been encouraging (Table VI).
By November 1992, 67 units had been sold, i.e. a letter of intent had been
issued. Of these 67 units, the management of 47 units has been transferred to
the private sector on receipt of at least 14 percent of the sales price. The new
owners are required to pay at least an additional 26 percent of the sales price
within 30 days of the date management is transferred, and the remaining 60
percent balance must be paid within three years (with a 14 percent p.a. mark-up). 
While these results represent a considerable achievement, the Government
needs to decide how to proceed further. To complete the privatization process of
the 105 units, the Government may have to adjust the sales prices or liquidate
certain units. For most of the remaining units no bids at the set reserve price
were received. It may be necessary to remove the reserve price and simply sell
to the highest bidder. 
Number of units Value of units
For Manag sold (Rs mill)
Total sale Sold transfer Total Received
Commercial banks 5 4 2 2 5,122 2,135
Industrial units 124 105 67 47 8,219 3,896
Autos 15 10 8 5 1,043 583
Cement 15 15 11 8 4,658 2,253
Chemicals 14 12 5 5 1,030 431
Engineering 12 9 4 4 141 58
Fertilizer 7 5 2 1 457 183
Ghee/veg oil 23 23 15 9 626 250
Roti plants 17 17 13 11 99 60
Rice mills 8 8 7 4 165 78
Miscellaneous 13 6 2 0 0 0
Total 129 109 69 49 13,341 6,031
Source: Ministry of Finance
Table VI.
Pakistan: privatization






Many of the entities remaining unsold after removing the reserve price,
especially those which never received any bids are candidates for liquidation.
Most of these companies were already technically bankrupt when they were put
on the list. The Privatization Commission should identify the companies that
can be financially restructured and re-auctioned, and those whose assets will
have to be sold off, taking the loss-making operation out of the market. The
Government also needs to consider how to expand the program to the 60
industrial enterprises not yet targeted for privatization as well as others in the
service and infrastructure sectors. Some of these enterprises are fairly large
and/or provide key goods and services to the economy. 
Note
1. The detailed results (in the form of tables similar to Tables I-III) of this and other types of
government and private investment are available from the author on request.
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